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Abstract
We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two
strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The
principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that has two states, one “good” and one
“bad” absorbing state, and has to decide how to sequentially disclose information to the detec-
tor. The detector’s only information consists of the messages she receives from the principal.
The detector’s objective is to detect as accurately as possible the time of the jump from the
good to the bad state. The principal’s objective is to delay the detector as much as possible
from detective the jump to the bad state. For this setting, we determine the optimal strategies
of the principal and the detector. The detector’s optimal strategy is described by time-varying
thresholds on her posterior belief of the good state. We prove that it is optimal for the prin-
cipal to give no information to the detector before a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to
confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true state afterwards. We present an
algorithm that determines both the optimal time threshold and the optimal mixed strategy that
could be employed by the principal. We show, through numerical experiments, that this opti-
mal sequential mechanism significantly outperforms any other information disclosure strategy
presented in literature.
1 Introduction
The decentralization of information is an inevitable facet of managing a large system. In modern
technological systems, agents constantly face the challenge of making decisions under incomplete
and asymmetric information. This challenge arises in many different applications, including trans-
portation, cyber-security, communication, energy management, smart grids and E-commerce.
There is a large body of literature on the issues related to decision making in informationally
decentralized systems when the agents are cooperative and jointly wish to maximize a social welfare
function which is usually the sum of their utilities [18, 4]. The problem is more challenging when
the agents are selfish and not concerned about the society as a whole, but only aim at maximizing
their own utility. Currently there exist two approaches to the design of efficient multi-agent systems
with asymmetric information and selfish/strategic agents. In the following, we briefly describe these
approaches.
1. Mechanism Design. In this approach, each of the strategic agents (e.g. power generating
companies in an energy network) is assumed to possess some private information (e.g. their own
valuation/utility functions). There is a coordinator (e.g. an Independent System Operator, ISO)
who wishes to optimize a network performance metric (e.g. social welfare) which depends on
the agents’ private information. To elicit strategic agents’ true information, the coordinator (he)
needs to provide incentives to them (e.g. a plan for energy production along with monetary taxes
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or subsidies) so as to align their strategic objectives (e.g. maximization of a strategic agent’s
utility) with his own objective (e.g. maximization of social welfare). In this situation, the system’s
information structure (who knows what and when) is fixed, and the coordinator’s goal is to design
a mechanism that incentivizes the strategic agents to reveal their information truthfully [48].
2. Information Design. In this approach, the coordinator (e.g. a central control center in
a metropolitan area) knows perfectly the evolution of the system’s state (e.g. the evolution of
traffic in the transportation network), but the decision making (e.g. route selection) is done by
the strategic agents (e.g. drivers) who have incomplete/imperfect knowledge of the state (e.g.
drivers only know the traffic in their immediate vicinity). To incentivize strategic agents to take
actions that are desirable for the coordinator, he can provide, sequentially over time, information
about the system’s state to them (e.g. provide traffic updates to selfish drivers). The goal of
information provision/disclosure is the alignment of each agent’s objective (e.g. minimization of
the average time to reach the destination) with the coordinator’s objective (e.g. minimization of
the traffic in the roads). In this situation, the game-form/mechanism is fixed but the system’s
information structure is not fixed. It has to be designed by the coordinator through the sequential
disclosure/provision of information to the strategic agents so as to serve his goal [17, 59].
This paper addresses an information design problem. Information design problems are also
referred to as Bayesian persuasion problems because the strategic agents are assumed to under-
stand how information is generated/ manipulated and react to information in a rational (Bayesian)
manner. Therefore, information design problems can be seen as persuading Bayesian agents to act
in desirable ways. The coordinator who would like to lead other agents to act as he wants is usually
referred to as the principal. The system state is the principal’s private information which can be
used to persuade others to serve his goal.
Information design problems in dynamic environments involving a principal and long-term-
optimizing strategic agents are challenging to the following reason. The information disclosed by
the principal at each time instant impacts the agents’ decision making in two ways: 1) it affects the
agents’ future decisions through altering their knowledge about the principal’s private information;
2) it influences their decisions at the past times by changing what they expect to achieve in the
future. Currently, very little is known about the design of optimal sequential information disclosure
policies in dynamic environments with long-term-optimizing agents. Therefore, we focus on a
very simple problem that allows us to highlight how sequential information provision/disclosure
strategies can be designed in dynamic environments with long-term optimizing strategic agents.
We consider a version of the quickest detection problem [55] with a strategic principal (he) and
one strategic agent/detector (she). The detector wants to detect when a two-state discrete-time
Markov chain jumps from the “good” state to the “bad” absorbing state. The detector cannot
make direct observations of the Markov chain’s state. Instead, she receives, at each time instant,
a message from the principal about the Markov chain’s state. The principal observes perfectly the
evolution of the Markov chain; his objective is to delay, as much as possible, detection of the jump
by the detector. At the beginning of the process, the principal commits to a sequential information
disclosure strategy/policy which he announces to the detector. The detectors knowledge of the
policy shapes her interpretation of the messages she receives. For each fixed sequential information
disclosure policy of the principal, the detector is faced with a standard quickest detection problem
with noisy observations. The principal’s goal is to determine the sequential information disclosure
policy that convinces the detector to wait as long as possible before declaring the jumps. A precise
formulation of this problem is presented in Sections 2 and 3.
In this paper, we discover an optimal sequential information disclosure strategy for the principal.
We prove that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the detector before a time
threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true
state afterwards. We present an algorithm that determines both the optimal time threshold and
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the optimal mixed strategy that could be employed by the principal.
1.1 Review of Related Works
Information disclosure mechanisms can be seen as a communication protocol between an informa-
tion transmitter (he) and one or multiple receivers. A significant part of the existing works in
this area have studied the nonstrategic case, where the information transmitter and receivers are
cooperative and jointly wish to maximize the global utility [62, 61, 43, 46, 60].
The strategic case of information disclosure mechanisms (Bayesian Persuasion), where the
transmitter (principal) and receiver have misaligned objectives, is in tradition of cheap talk
[16, 8, 50, 3, 34, 35], and signaling games [56, 30]. In signaling games, the transmitter’s utility
depends not only on the receiver’s actions, but also on his type (private information). However, in
information design problems neither the principal’s type nor his actions enter his utility directly;
they only influence his utility through the effect they have on the receivers’ actions. This feature
of the model enables us to investigate/analyze the pure effect of principal’s private information on
the receivers’ behaviors.
The main difference between cheap talk and information design is the level of commitment
power they give to the principal. In the cheap talk literature, the principal has no commitment
power ; he decides on the information message to be sent after seeing the realization of his private
information. The cheap talk model induces a simultaneous game between the principal and the
agents. Thus, the main goal of this strand of works is to characterize the (Nash) equilibria of the
induced game. Most of the existing work has focused on the static setting [16, 8, 50, 3]. The work
of [16] shows that when the state of the system (principal’s private information) is one-dimensional
and both the principals and the agents utilities are quadratic, the principals equilibrium strategy
employs quantization. More general models of cheap talk, such as multidimensional sources [8],
noisy communication [50] and multiple principals with misaligned objectives [3], have been studied
in the literature for static settings. There are a few works that study the dynamic version of
the cheap talk communication [34, 35]. These works show that allowing for dynamic information
transmission improves the informativeness of communication.
In information design problems the transmitter is endowed with full commitment power. In this
model, the transmitter is allowed to send any distribution of messages as a function of the system
state, but he should choose and announce his information disclosure policy before observing the
system state and then stay committed to it forever. By committing to an information disclosure
policy at the very beginning of the system’s operation, the transmitter can persuade all other
agents to employ strategies that achieve his objective. The fact that a player in a game can
improve his outcome through commitment was first established in [57, 53, 52] (see also [36]). The
full commitment assumption holds in many economic ([28, 33, 9]) and engineering ([17, 59]) multi-
agent systems.
The literature on information design is generally divided into two main categories: static and
dynamic information design problems.
Static information design problems. The static version of the problem, where the state
of the system is fixed and no time is involved, has been studied extensively in the literature. The
authors of [1] consider a problem of static information disclosure where the state of the system is
Gaussian and the utilities are quadratic, and show that there exists a linear policy for the principal
that leads to a Stackelberg equilibrium. In [38, 12] the authors propose a concavification method
for deriving an optimal information provision mechanism in static settings. The concavification
approach was first developed by a group of U.S. economists and game theorists, led by R. Aumann
and M. Maschler, with the context of the negotiations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT) between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (see [6]). The approach was developed for problems that
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can be modeled as repeated games of incomplete information. For over half a century, this idea
played an important role in the analysis of repeated games (see [65, 24] and references therein) but
has not been applied to information design problems until 2011 [38].
Following [38], information design problem has been studied for more general settings, such
as costly communication [29], multi-dimensional state [58], multiple principals [27, 41], multiple
receivers [11, 10], and receivers with different prior beliefs [2]. A case of information design problem
with transfers where the principal can provide both information and monetary incentives to the
receiver is also studied in [40]. There is a group of works in static information disclosure which
are more applied and aim to understand or improve real-world institutions via information design.
Research in this strand includes applications to grading in schools [15], research procurement [64],
medical testing [54], price discrimination [9], insurance [26], and routing software [39, 17, 59, 66, 63].
A through discussion of the literature on information design up until 2018 appears in [37].
Dynamic information design problems. The dynamic version of the information design
problem, where the informed-player/principal can disclose his superior information sequentially
over time, has recently been attracting rapidly growing interest. In dynamic environments, agents’
decisions at each instant of time affect their opponents’ decisions, not only at present but also in
the future. The problem becomes more tangled if the information transmitter has commitment
power. In this case, the information disclosure policy that the principal commits to for the future,
has a direct effect on the receivers’ estimation of what they can gain in the future, and hence on
their current decisions. The interdependency among the agents’ decision making processes over
time makes the dynamic information design problems very complex and challenging.
Most of the available works avoid this challenge by assuming that the agents are myopic, that
is they only look at each instant at the immediate consequence of their actions, ignoring the
subsequent (future) effects. In [23] and [51] both the information transmitter and receivers are
assumed to be myopic. Under this simplifying assumption, [51] shows that the principal’s optimal
information disclosure policy is a set of linear functions of the current state.
To make the problem closer to reality, the authors of [42, 20, 49, 14, 13] consider the myopic
assumption only for the information receivers. This set of works studies the interactions between a
long-term-optimizing principal and either a myopic receiver or a sequence of short-lived receivers.
In the latter case, at each instant of time a new receiver enters the system, forms her belief about
the sender’s strategy by observing the history of the past messages, takes her action, and then exits
the system. In such a case, since the receivers leave the system after taking only one action, they
are not concerned about the subsequent effects of their decisions. Therefore, considering a sequence
of short-lived receivers is exactly equivalent to assuming that the receiver is myopic. Under this
assumption, [20] proposes a generalization of the concavification method for dynamic information
design problems. The authors of [49] show that when the receiver is myopic, the greedy disclosure
policy where the principal minimizes the amount of information being disclosed in each stage, under
the constraint that it maximizes his current payoff, is optimal in many cases, but not always.
There are only a few papers which study the dynamic information design problem with both
long-term-optimizing principal and long-term-optimizing receivers [31, 47, 32, 21, 19, 7, 5, 22, 59,
44]. In [31, 47, 32] principal is assumed to have no commitment power. This assumption simplifies
the problem as in this case, the principal’s policy at each time instant affects the receiver’s decisions
only at the future and not at the past. Although in some of these works communication is costly,
they could be seen, due to lack of commitments, as dynamic versions of cheap-talk problem. The
authors in [21, 19, 7, 5, 22, 59, 44] study the dynamic interactions between a long-term-optimizing
principal who has full commitment power and a long-term optimizing receiver. In [21, 19, 7, 5]
the private information of the principal is considered to be constant and not varying with time.
The problem with time-varying private information for the principal is discussed in [22, 59, 44]
for dynamic two-stage settings. The authors of [44] also tackle the information design problem in
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an infinite-horizon setting. In this setting, they first simplify the problem by restricting attention
to a special class of information disclosure mechanisms and then characterize a mechanism that
improves the principal’s utility, but is not always optimal.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that provides an optimal informa-
tion disclosure mechanism in a dynamic setting with an arbitrary horizon length and long-term-
optimizing principal and receiver, when the principal has full commitment power and his private
information evolves over time.
There are a few works in the literature of information design that combine mechanism design
and information design to obtain the benefits of both approaches [32, 19]. In these papers, the
principal changes both the game-form and the information structure of the play so as to persuade
the receiver to take his desirable actions. This approach is not relevant to this paper, as we want
to study the effect of the transmitter’s information superiority in controlling receivers’ behaviors.
1.2 Contribution
We formulate a dynamic information design problem over finite time horizon, where the information
transmitter (principal) and the information receiver are long-term optimizing strategic agents.
In this problem, the principal wants to use his superior information about system state, which
evolves over time, to encourage the receiver to behave such that the interests of principal could
be maximized. For this setting, we determine the optimal strategies of both the principal and the
receiver. We prove that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the receiver before
a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the receiver at the threshold time, and reveal
the true state afterwards. The principal should announce this information disclosure policy before
observing the system state and then stay committed to it forever.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of a dynamical information design problem
with long-term optimizing agents where an explicit solution for the optimal strategies of the agents
is determined.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our dynamic information design prob-
lem with strategic and long-term-optimizing agents in Section 2. In Section 3, we formulate the
principals problem as a dynamic information design problem and discuss its main features. We
describe the optimal sequential information disclosure mechanism we propose for the solution to
this problem in Section 4. In Section 5, we show the superiority of our proposed mechanism by
comparing it to non-strategic mechanisms that are used in real-world applications. We conclude
our paper in Section 6. The proofs of all the technical results appear in Appendices 1-9.
2 Model
Consider a Markov chain {st, t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , T}} with state space {g(good), b(bad)} and a
one-step transition probability matrix
P =
(
1− q q
0 1
)
The chain starts in the good state with probability µ, i.e. P (s1 = g) = µ, and then at each instant
of time t = 2, . . . , T , may switch from g to b with probability q. State b is an absorbing state,
meaning that once the Markov chain goes to the bad state, it remains in that state forever. We
denote the random time when Markov chain jumps from the good state to the bad state by θ. The
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situation where the Markov chain starts in the bad state is captured by considering θ = 1. If the
Markov chain remains in the good state until the end of the time period T , we consider θ = T + 1.
Therefore, the distribution of the random variable θ is as follows:
P(θ = θ′) =

1− µ, if θ′ = 1,
µ (1− q)θ′−2 q, if 2 ≤ θ′ ≤ T,
µ (1− q)T−1, if θ′ = T + 1,
(1)
There is a strategic detector (she) in the system who wants to detect the jump to the bad state
as accurately as possible. Let τ denote the (random) time the detector declares that the jump has
occurred. The detector’s cost associated with declaring the jump at time τ is
JD(τ, θ) = 1{τ<θ} + 1{τ≥θ}c(τ − θ), (2)
where 1{A} is the indicator function of an event A, which takes value one if A occurs, and zero
otherwise. The detector pays one unit of cost if she declares the jump before it actually happens
(i.e. false alarm), and pays c units of cost per unit of delayed detection. The goal of the detector is
to choose a detection time τ so as to minimize the expected value of the cost (2). The detector does
not observe the Markov chain’s state st, but she receives some information about it from another
agent called the principal.
At each instant of time t, the principal (he) observes perfectly the Markov chain’s state st and
sends, according to some information transmission/ disclosure strategy ρ = (ρ1, . . . ,ρT ), a message
mt to the detector. When the detector receives the message mt, she updates her belief about the
state of the system in a Bayesian way (using ρ), and based on her new belief she decides whether
or not to declare that the jump has occurred. Let at ∈ {k, d} denote the detector’s action at time
t ∈ T , where at = k indicates that the detector keeps silent at time t and does not declare a jump,
and at = d indicates that she declares that the jump has occurred. For any fixed choice of the
principal’s strategy ρ, the detector has to solve a quickest detection problem [55] to find her best
sequence of actions. Therefore, the detector’s optimal strategy at each time instant t is described by
a threshold; these thresholds are time-varying and depend on the choice of the principal’s strategy
ρ.
The principal’s objective is to delay detection of the jump. Therefore, utilizing his superior
information about the state of the Markov chain, the principal attempts to provide informational
incentives to the detector so as to persuade her to keep silent. The principal’s utility is
UP (τ) = τ − 1. (3)
The detector’s decision depends on her belief about the evolution of the system’s unknown state
st; this belief depends on the principal’s strategy ρ. Therefore, the principle must design a dynamic
(over time) information disclosure mechanism in order to influence the evolution of the detector’s
beliefs and therefore her sequence of actions.
The above-described model captures fundamental issues arising in strategic information trans-
mission problems, such as deception problems. In deception problems, the information transmitter
(he) strategically crafts the information towards his own benefit that is in conflict with the objective
of the receiver (she) who uses the information to make decisions which affect the transmitter’s util-
ity. In other words, the transmitter, through deceptive signaling, attempts to control the receiver’s
perception (about the state of nature) so as to lead her to act in line with his own interests. De-
ception problems arise in Cyber-physical systems, such as power-systems, transportation systems,
water-networks, that are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
In the next section, we formulate this problem as a dynamic information design problem, and
design a dynamic information disclosure mechanism that maximizes the principal’s utility.
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Remark 1. Our model is similar to Ely’s model [20] in that they both consider an uninformed
agent (detector) who wants to detect the transition of a two-state Markov chain to its absorbing
state. In both models the goal of the information provider is to delay such detection. However,
there is a fundamental difference between our model and that of Ely. In Ely’s model, the detector
uses a time-invariant decision rule that is characterized by a fixed threshold p∗. Specifically, the
detector declares that the jump from the “good” state to the “bad” state occurs, at the first time
instant τ at which her (posterior) belief that the Markov chain is in the bad state exceeds p∗. Such
a decision strategy is not optimal for either a finite-horizon or an infinite-horizon quickest detection
problem. In the finite T-horizon quickest detection problem the detector’s optimal decision rule
is characterized by a sequence of time-varying thresholds that depend on the parameter c (See
Eq. (2)) and on the functional form of her observations (i.e. the principal’s information disclosure
strategy). In the infinite-horizon quickest detection problem the detector’s optimal decision rule
is characterized by a time-invariant threshold as long as the functional form of her observations
(i.e. the principal’s information disclosure strategy) is time-invariant. It turns out that in our
problem as well as in Ely’s problem [20] the principal’s (optimal) information disclosure strategy
is not time-invariant, therefore, the detector’s optimal decision strategy is not characterized by a
time-invariant threshold.
In our problem the detector’s decision rule is the optimal decision rule for the T-horizon quick-
est detection problem where the functional form of her observations is the principal’s optimal
information disclosure strategy.
3 The Dynamic Information Design Problem
3.1 Problem Formulation
A dynamic information disclosure mechanism specifies the set of messages Mt that the principal
sends to the detector at each instant of time t ∈ T , along with a distribution over Mt given all
the information available to the principal at time t. The principal’s information at time t consists
of 1) the history of evolution of the state (which the principal observes perfectly) up to time t,
i.e. s1:t, 2) the history of his past messages to the detector, i.e. m1:t−1, and 3) the history of
the detector’s past actions, i.e. a1:t−1. The set of dynamic information disclosure mechanisms is
completely general, it includes the extremes of full information, no information, and all conceivable
intermediate mechanisms. The full information mechanism is the rule that reveals perfectly the
current state st : i.e., Mt = {g, b} and P(mt = st) = 1. A no information mechanism is obtained
when the set of messages Mt has only one element and the principle sends that single message
irrespective of the system state.
As it is clear from the above examples, a dynamic information disclosure mechanism could
be very complicated since there is no restriction on the set of messages Mt or the probability
distribution on Mt, t ∈ T . However, it is shown in [38] that there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to direct dynamic information disclosure mechanisms that are obedient. Thus,
we concentrate on direct dynamic information disclosure mechanisms that are obedient.
In a direct information disclosure mechanism, at each instant of time, the principal directly
recommends to the detector the action she should take. In our problem, the detector’s possible
actions at each time t are to either keep silent (at = k) or declare the jump (at = d). There-
fore, the set of messages used by the principal at each time t is Mt = M = {k, d}, where k is
a recommendation to keep silent, and d is a recommendation to declare a jump. As a result, the
principal’s behavior in a direct information disclosure mechanism can be described by a recommen-
dation policy ρ = (ρ
s1:t,m1:t−1,a1:t−1
t , t ∈ T ), where ρs1:t,m1:t−1,a1:t−1t is the probability according to
which the principal sends message k to the detector (i.e. recommends her to keep silent), when the
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sequence of the states he has observed up to time t is s1:t = (s1, . . . , st), the history of the past
messages he has sent is m1:t−1 = (m1, . . . ,mt−1), and the history of the detector’s past actions is
a1:t−1 = (a1, . . . , at−1). For each t ∈ T , s1:t ∈ {g, b}t, and m1:t−1, a1:t−1 ∈ {k, d}t−1, the principal
sends message d to the detector with probability 1−ρs1:t,m1:t−1,a1:t−1t . There are two features in our
problem that help us to simplify the principal’s information.
1) At each instant of time, the detector has two actions one of which (i.e. declaring the jump)
terminates the whole process. Therefore, making a recommendation at time t is meaningful for the
principal only if the detector kept silent at all the previous times, i.e. a1:t−1 = (k)t−1. Thus, a1:t−1
can be omitted from the principal’s information.
2) The bad state of our Markov chain is an absorbing state. Therefore, the state evolution of
the Markov chain until time t is of the form s1:t = ((g)
θt−1, (b)t−θt+1), where θt could take any
integer value between 1 and t+ 1. We define θt as the earliest possible time for the jump based on
the principal’s information at time t; i.e. θt = min (θ, t+ 1). The parameter θt is equal to θ if the
jump has occurred up to time t, however it takes value t+ 1 when the principal finds the Markov
chain in the good state at time t. Because of this feature, we can represent the recommendation
policy ρ
s1:t,m1:t−1
t of each time t by ρ
θt,m1:t−1
t , where θt ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1}.
When the principal designs an information disclosure mechanism, he announces the correspond-
ing recommendation policy ρ to the detector and commits to it.
The detector is strategic; she utilizes the information she receives from the principal to her own
advantage and does not necessarily follow the actions recommended by the principal. Therefore,
to achieve his goal, the principal must design an information disclosure mechanism that possesses
the obedience property, that is, it provides the detector with strong enough incentives to follow his
recommendations.
At each time t ∈ T , the long-term-optimizing detector obeys the principal if the recommended
action mt minimizes her conditional expected continuation cost, i.e.,
mt = arg min
at
[
min
γt+1:T
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t}
]
, ∀t,m1:t, (4)
where γt+1:T denotes her decision strategy profile from time t + 1 up to T , and
minγt+1:T E
ρ
t:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t} is her minimum expected continuation cost conditional on her in-
formation m1:t when the principal commits to the information disclosure strategy/mechanism ρ.
Therefore, to check the obedience property of a direct information disclosure mechanism at any
time t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , we need to solve the series/sequence of optimization problems
min
at
[
min
γt+1:T
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t}
]
, (5)
for all m1:t. Solving these optimization problems is a challenging and time-consuming task. How-
ever, the one-shot deviation principle allows us to derive the obedience constraints by assuming
that the detector sticks to the obedient strategy in the future. Specifically, considering a fixed
direct information disclosure mechanism, the whole process can be seen as a finite extensive-form
game between the detector and nature (principal), where at each stage t nature sends a signal mt
to the detector according to ρt and then the detector takes an action at. With this interpretation,
the set of obedience constraints (4) is a necessary and sufficient set of conditions for the strategy
profile at = mt, for t ∈ T , to be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) [45]. According to
the one-shot deviation principle a strategy profile γ is a SPNE if and only if no player can increase
their payoffs by deviating from γ for one period and then reverting to the strategy [25]. Therefore,
a simpler version of the obedience constraints is as follows:
mt=arg min
at
[
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at+1:T =mρt+1:T }
]
, (6)
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for all t and m1:t, where the condition at+1:T = m
ρ
t+1:T of the expectation reflects the fact that the
detector obeys the recommendations from time t + 1 onward, and the notation mρt+1:T indicates
that the messages mt+1:T are generated according to the policy ρ.
Equation (6) includes
∑T
t=1 2
t = 2(2T − 1) constraints. These constraints force the detector
to obey the recommendations after each message history m1:t. However, due to the nature of our
problem, the first time the detector is recommended to declare a jump in an obedient mechanism,
she will do so and the process will terminate. Therefore, the message histories with at least one
d in the past are not going to occur and need not be checked. This feature reduces the obedience
constraints need to be considered to the following:
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = (k)t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T }
≤ Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = (k)t, at = d}, ∀t ∈ T ,
(7)
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t=((k)t−1, d), at=k, at+1:T =mρt+1:T }
≥ Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t=((k)t−1, d), at=d},∀t∈T ,
(8)
(2T constraints).
Now that we derived the obedience constraints, we go through calculating the principal’s utility.
When the detector follows the recommendation policy ρ, the expected utility the principal gets is
Eρ{UP (τ)} = Eρ{τ − 1} = Eρ{
T∑
t=1
1{a1:t=(k)t}}
=
T∑
t=1
P(a1:t = (k)t|ρ) =
T∑
t=1
P(mρ1:t = (k)
t)
=
T∑
t=1
T+1∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
t∏
t′=1
ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t
′−1
t′ .
(9)
Therefore, we can formulate the information design problem (Problem P) for the principal as
follows:
max
ρ
Eρ{UP (τ)}, (P)
subject to the obedience constraints (7)-(8),
0 ≤ ρθt,m1:t−1t ≤ 1, ∀t, θt,m1:t−1.
That is, the principal wants to choose a feasible dynamic information disclosure mechanism ρ that
satisfies the obedience constraints (7)-(8) and maximizes his expected utility given by (9).
3.2 Features of The Problem
Solving the optimization problem (P) is a formidable task as the optimization variables are strongly
coupled with many non-convex constraints. This strong coupling can be seen by taking a closer look
at the expectations appearing in the obedience constraints (7)-(8). According to (2), the detector’s
expected continuation cost from time t onward when she has received messages m1:t and decides
to declare the jump at time t is
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at = d} = P(st = g|m1:t), (10)
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i.e., the probability of false alarm at t. If the detector decides to keep silent at time t and sticks to
the obedient strategy at the future, her expected continuation cost is
Eρt:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T } =
c(1−P(st=g|m1:t))+
Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at=k, at+1:T =mρt+1:T }, (11)
where the first term on the right hand side is the expected delay cost at time t, and the second
term denotes the expected value of all the future costs from time t+ 1 onward. Substituting (10)-
(11) in (7)-(8) shows that at each time t, the detector’s decision to obey or disobey the principal’s
recommendation depends on two factors:
(i) the belief the detector has about the good state of the Markov chain, i.e. P(st = g|m1:t);
this belief is constructed according to Bayes’ rule from the past messages m1:t she received, hence
the past recommendation rules ρ
θt′ ,m1:t′−1
t′ (t
′ ≤ t) that generate these messages, as follows:
P(st = g|m1:t) = P(st = g,m1:t)P(m1:t) =
P(st = g)P(m1:t|st = g)∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)P(m1:t|θ = θ′)
=
P(θ>t)
∏t
t′=1 [ρ
t′+1,m1:t′−1
t′ 1{mt′=k} + (1− ρ
t′+1,m1:t′−1
t′ )1{mt′=d}]∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ=θ′)
∏t
t′=1 [ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),m1:t′−1
t′ 1{mt′=k}+(1−ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),m1:t′−1
t′ )1{mt′=d}]
. (12)
(ii) the cost the detector expects to incur in the future if she remains silent at time t and follows the
recommendations afterwards, i.e. Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T }. This expected
cost depends on the messages the detector expects to receive in the future. These messages depend
on the future recommendation rules to which the principal commits, i.e. ρ
θt′ ,m1:t′−1
t′ , t
′ > t, ∀θ.
Therefore, the detector’s decision at each time t depends not only on the recommendation policy
for time t, but also on the recommendation policies for all times before and after t. The dependence
of the detector’s decision at each time t on the recommendation policy for the entire horizon makes
the discovery of an optimal information disclosure mechanism that satisfies the obedience property
very challenging. This is mainly because any change in the principal’s recommendation policy at
any time t affects the detector’s decisions at all times. Therefore, the principal cannot optimize
the recommendation policies of different time slots separately just by considering the obedience
constraints at that time, instead he needs to optimize the recommendation policies of the whole
horizon simultaneously.
4 An Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure Mechanism
In this section we present the main result of the paper, namely, a dynamic information disclo-
sure mechanism that solves the principal’s problem, expressed by Problem (P). The mechanism is
described in Theorem 1 below. To state Theorem 1 we need the following definitions.
Definition 1. Define by ΓM the class of information disclosure mechanisms ρ = (ρ
st,m1:t−1
t , t ∈ T )
where ρ
st,m1:t−1
t depends on the message profile m1:t−1 received by the detector up to time t − 1
and only the current state st of the Markov chain at time t (not on the state evolution s1:t).
Definition 2. A mechanism ρ = (ρ
st,m1:t−1
t , t ∈ T ) ∈ ΓM is called time-based prioritized if:
(i). ρ
g,m1:t−1
t = 1 for all t and all m1:t−1;
(ii). there is no time t, t ∈ T , such that ρb,(k)tt+1 > 0 while ρb,(k)
t−1
t < 1, where (k)
t = (k, . . . , k) is a
vector of length t with all components equal to k; and
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Algorithm 1: An optimal time-based prioritized information disclosure mechanism
1 for np = 1, . . . , T do
2 qnp ← mint≤np
{
1
P(θ≤np) (
P(θ>t)
c −
∑np−1
l=t P(θ≤ l))
}
;
3 if qnp < 1 then
4 break;
5 n∗p ←− np ;
6 q∗np ←− qnp .
(iii). for all t ∈ T , ρb,m1:t−1t is arbitrary, 0 ≤ ρb,m1:t−1t ≤ 1, when m1:t−1 6= (k)t.
We denote by ΓMP the class of time-based prioritized mechanisms. In information disclosure
mechanism ρ ∈ ΓMP , the priority of keeping the detector silent at each time t > θ is higher than
keeping her silent at t+1. Therefore, if st = b the principal does not put any effort in manipulating
the detector’s information at t + 1 unless there is no room for improving his own performance at
time t. As a consequence of Definition 2, for each mechanism ρ ∈ ΓMP , there is a threshold np
such that
ρ
b,(k)t−1
t =

1, t < np,
0, t > np,
qnp , t = np, qnp ∈ [0, 1] .
(13)
Therefore, any ρ ∈ ΓMP can be uniquely described by ρ = (np, qnp).
Theorem 1. Without loss of optimality, in Problem (P) the principal can restrict attention to
time-based prioritized mechanisms. Determining an optimal time-based prioritized mechanism ρ∗
for Problem (P) is equivalent to finding n∗p + q∗np = max
{
np + qnp
}
such that the mechanism
(np, qnp) satisfies all the obedience constraints. The optimal time-based prioritized information
disclosure mechanism can be obtained by Algorithm 1 above.
The principal’s expected utility at ρ∗ = (n∗p, q∗np) is
Eρ
∗{UP } = n∗p − 1 + P(θ ≤ n∗p)q∗np +
T∑
t=n∗p
P(θ > t). (14)
Outline of the proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 provides us with an optimal sequential information disclosure mechanism. We prove
this theorem in three steps.
In the first step, we reduce the complexity of the optimization problem (P) by reduc-
ing/simplifying the domain of ρ. To this end, we show that:
1) the recommendation policy the principal uses at any time t when he has advised the detector
to declare the jump at least once before t, plays no role in problem (P);
2) without loss of optimality, the principal can restrict attention to mechanisms ρ =
(ρ
st,m1:t−1
t , t ∈ T ) ∈ ΓM . In this class of mechanisms, the recommendation policy at any time
t depends only on the state st of the Markov chain and the principal’s previous messages m1:t−1
(not on the state evolution s1:t−1).
In the second step, we prove that ρ
g,m1:t−1
t = 1, for t ∈ T and all m1:t−1. Thus, when the
Markov chain is in the good state, the principal always recommends the detector to wait.
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In the third step, we use the results of the first two steps to prove that restricting attention to
the class of time-based prioritized mechanisms is without loss of optimality. Then, we determine
an optimal solution for the dynamic information disclosure problem (P) in this class.
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove in the appendix the lemmas appearing in each step.
Step 1. As we discussed in Section 3, the principal’s behavior in a direct dynamic information
disclosure mechanism is described by a recommendation policy ρ = (ρ
θt,m1:t−1
t , t ∈ T ), where
ρ
θt,m1:t−1
t is the probability with which the principal recommends the detector to keep silent at time
t, when θt = min (θ, t+ 1) and the message profile that has been sent so far is m1:t−1. For each time
t, θt could take any integer value between 1 and t+ 1. Moreover, the principal’s message may take
two values at each time slot, so we can have 2t−1 different message profiles at each time t. Therefore,
to design an optimal direct dynamic information disclosure mechanism we need to determine the
optimal values of
∑T
t=1 2
t−1(t+ 1) = 2TT different variables. This number grows exponentially
with the horizon length T . Furthermore, these variables are coupled with one another through the
obedience constraints (7)-(8), hence their optimal values must be determined simultaneously. The
large number of design variables and their dependence on one another make the determination of
an optimal information disclosure mechanism a formidable task. Therefore, our goal in this step is
to reduce the number of design variables, without any loss of optimality. We achieve our goal via
the results of Lemmas 1 and 2. Before stating Lemmas 1 and 2, we define the following function
that counts the number of time epochs the detector was recommended to declare the jump in the
past.
Definition 3. For each time t and each message history m1:t−1, we defineNd(m1:t−1) as the number
of time slots where message d has been sent to the detector.
Lemma 1. For each time t, the recommendation policy ρ
θt,m1:t−1
t needs to be designed only for
message profiles m1:t−1 with Nd(m1:t−1) ≤ 1. The part of the recommendation policy related to
cases where the message d has been sent more than once has no effect on either the obedience
property of the mechanism or the utility it gets to the principal.
As a result of Lemma 1, an optimal recommendation policy must determine the optimal values
of
∑T
t=1 t(t+ 1) =
1
3T (T + 1)(T + 2) variables. This number grows polynomially rather than
exponentially with the horizon length T , so the complexity of the information disclosure problem
is significantly reduced.
Lemma 2. Without loss of optimality, for each message profile m1:t−1, the principal can restrict
attention to recommendation policies that depend, at each time t, on the current state st of the
Markov chain and not on the exact time the jump has occurred.
As a result of Lemma 2, at each time t, and for each message profile m1:t−1, the principal needs
to consider only two recommendation strategies, one when st = g the other when st = b. Therefore,
the total number of design variables is
∑T
t=1 2t = T (T + 1), which grows as T
2 rather than T 3.
Step 2. We derive an optimal recommendation strategy for the principal when the Markov
chain is in the good state.
Lemma 3. If at any time t the Markov chain is in the good state, irrespective of the message
profile m1:t−1, it is always optimal for the principal to recommend the detector to keep silent. That
is
ρ
∗ g,m1:t−1
t = 1,∀m1:t−1, ∀t ∈ T , (15)
The result of Lemma 3 is intuitive, because when the state of the Markov chain is good there
is no conflict of interest between the principal and the detector. In this state, the principal wants
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Figure 1: An example of the Principal’s utility function in a time-based prioritized mechanism
to prevent the detector from declaring a jump, and the detector herself has no incentive to create
a false alarm. Therefore, there is no incentive for the principal to mislead the detector.
As a result Lemma 3, when the detector is recommended to declare a jump, she is absolutely
sure that the Markov chain is in the bad state, thus, she declares a jump. Therefore, the obedience
constraints (8) corresponding to situations where the detector receives recommendation mt = d are
automatically satisfied and can be neglected in the rest of the design process. Moreover, if any mes-
sage d has been sent by the principal in the past, the detector declares a jump right after receiving
d and the whole process terminates. Therefore, we do not need to design a recommendation policy
for message profiles that contain at least one d. Consequently, the only variable we should design
at any time t, is the probability of recommending the detector to declare a jump when st = b and
m1:t−1 = (k)t−1. Finding the optimal values of these variables is the subject of the next step.
Step 3. First, we show that, without loss of optimality, the principal can restrict attention to
time-based prioritized mechanisms. Then, we determine such optimal mechanism.
Lemma 4. Without loss of optimality, the principal can restrict attention to the class of time-based
prioritized mechanisms.
We proceed now to complete the proof of our main result (Theorem 1). The expected utility of
a principal who uses time-based prioritized mechanism ρ = (np, qnp) is
E(np,qnp ){UP }=np−1+P(θ ≤ np)qnp+
T∑
t=np
P(θ > t). (16)
This can be seen as follows. Before the threshold time is reached, the detector is always rec-
ommended to keep silent. Therefore, at the first np − 1 time slots silence is guaranteed. At the
threshold period np, if the Markov chain is in the bad state (prob. P(θ ≤ np)), the detector remains
silent with probability qnp . However, if the Markov chain is in the good state (prob. P(θ > np)),
the detector remains silent for sure. At each time t after the threshold period, the detector keeps
quiet only if the jump has not occurred. The probability of this event is P(θ > t).
Equation (16) shows that for each constant threshold np, the principal’s expected utility is
an increasing linear function of qnp . Moreover, we have E(np,1){UP } = E(np+1,0){UP }. This is
true, simply because ρ = (np, 1) and ρ
′ = (np + 1, 0) are actually two representations of the same
mechanism. We can easily conclude from these two facts that the principal’s expected utility is a
piecewise linear function of np + qnp as depicted in Fig. 1. The slope of the segments increases
whenever the variable np + qnp takes an integer value.
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The arguments above show that finding the optimal time-based prioritized mechanism is equiv-
alent to finding the maximum value of np + qnp such that the mechanism ρ = (np, qnp) satisfies
the obedience constraints. With some algebra, it can be shown that for a time-based prioritized
mechanism ρ the obedience constraints (7) can be simplified to
c(
np−1∑
l=t
P(θ≤ l)+P(θ ≤ np)qnp) ≤ P(θ > t), ∀t ≤ np. (17)
These constraints are very intuitive as for each time t, 1) the right-hand side of (17) is the expected
cost of declaring the jump at time t; and 2) the left-hand side of (17) is the expected continuation
cost that the detector incurs from time t onward, when she follows the recommendations made by
the mechanism ρ = (np, qnp). Therefore, constraints (17) simply say that a time-based prioritized
mechanism is obedient if and only if the detector finds declaring the jump more costly than keeping
silent at each time t ≤ np when she is recommended to stay quiet.
The left-hand side of each obedience constraint in (17) is increasing in terms of qnp . Therefore,
if the obedience conditions are satisfied for a mechanism ρ = (np, qnp), they are also satisfied for
mechanisms with smaller values for qnp . Given that the mechanisms (np, 0) and (np − 1, 1) are the
same, we can conclude that obedience of a time-based-prioritized mechanism ρ = (np, qnp) implies
the obedience of all time-based-prioritized mechanisms with smaller values of np + qnp . Therefore,
there is a threshold k∗ such that the set of all obedient time-based-prioritized mechanisms consists
of the mechanisms for which np + qnp takes a value smaller than the threshold k
∗. The fact that
the principal’s expected utility is increasing in terms of np + qnp implies that the mechanism with
np + qnp = k
∗ is optimal. This optimal mechanism is uniquely determined by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 works as follows: It iterates over np = 1, . . . , T and at each iteration it computes
the maximum value of qnp such that ρ = (np, qnp) satisfies the obedience constraints (17) for all
t ≤ np. Achieving a maximum greater than 1 means that the mechanism (np, 1) = (np + 1, 0) not
only satisfies all the obedience constraints, but also has no binding constraints. This means that
there is still more room for improvement. Therefore, the algorithm goes to the next iteration to find
a mechanism with the greater utility for the principal. If at some iteration n∗p we obtain a maximum
of less than one for qnp we stop. The mechanism (n
∗
p, q
∗
np) satisfies all obedience constraints and
there are binding obedience constraints. Therefore, k∗ = n∗p + q∗np is the optimal threshold which
cannot be enhanced anymore anymore, hence ρ∗ = (n∗p, q∗np) is an optimal information disclosure
mechanism.
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete.
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5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we discuss and highlight some interesting features of our designed optimal mechanism
obtained with Algorithm 1. We also run some numerical experiments to observe its performance.
Feature 1. The mechanism is almost independent of the horizon length T . The only effect of
the horizon length on the optimal mechanism is to limit the threshold np from above. Therefore, as
long as the optimal threshold n∗p is an interior point, changing the time horizon T does not change
the optimal mechanism.
Feature 2. The optimal mechanism ρ∗ = (n∗p, q∗np) we propose is a time-based prioritized
mechanism. The principal in a time-based prioritized mechanism employs three different strategies
in different time regions (See Eq. (13)).
Region 1: In the first region which consists of times before the threshold n∗p, irrespective of
the Markov chain’s state st, the principal recommends the detector to keep silent. During this time
interval, the principal’s messages are independent of the Markov chain’s state. These messages
give no information to the detector and hence, without loss of optimality, can be removed from the
mechanism. Therefore, this region can be referred to as the no-information region.
Region 2: In the second region which takes only one time slot (i.e. t = n∗p), the principal
runs a mixed/randomized strategy to hide his information. In this time slot, the principal always
recommends the detector to keep silent if the Markov chain is in the good state. However, when the
Markov chain is in the bad state, he reveals this undesirable news only with a probability of q∗np .
By employing this strategy, the detector who receives the recommendation to keep silent cannot
distinguish whether this recommendation is caused by the truth-telling strategy of the principal in
the good state or by his randomized strategy in the bad state. Therefore, she makes a belief about
each of these two cases and takes an action that maximizes her expected continuation utility with
respect to these beliefs. The probability q∗np is chosen as the maximum probability which makes
obedience the best action for the detector. We referred to this region as the randomized region
Region 3: In the third region which consists of times after the threshold n∗p, the state of the
Markov chain can be exactly derived from the principal’s messages. In this time interval, a recom-
mendation to keep silent means that the Markov chain is in the good state and a recommendation
to declare the jump means that the state of the Markov chain has switched to the bad state. This
region can be referred to as the full-information region.
Based on the above arguments, we can depict the principal’s optimal strategy as in Fig. 2. In
this optimal mechanism, the principal does not give any information to the detector up to time
n∗p−1, but he promises that if the detector remains silent until that point, then he starts to provide
him with “almost accurate” information. The information provided by the principal after time
n∗p−1 would contain some noise at time n∗p, but will be precise and fully revealing of the state after
that.
The commitment of the principal to full disclosure of information after a certain time increases
the detector’s patience and gives her incentives to remain silent longer. To see this we compute
the length of time the detector remains silent in two instances: (1) when the principal employs a
no-information disclosure strategy for the whole horizon; (2) when the principal commits to full
information disclosure some time in the future. In the first instance, the detector’s expected cost
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Figure 2: The principal’s strategy in the optimal mechanism
if she declares the jump at τ = 1, . . . , T is
ENo{JD(τ, θ)} = P(θ > τ) + c
τ−1∑
t=1
P(θ ≤ t) =
µ(1− q)τ−1 + c
τ−1∑
t=1
(1− µ(1− q)t−1) =
µ(1− q)τ−1 + c(τ − 1)− cµ1− (1− q)
τ−1
q
.
(18)
If the detector keeps silent at the whole horizon, captured by τ = T + 1, her expected cost is
ENo{JD(T + 1, θ)}=c
T∑
t=1
P(θ ≤ t)=cT−cµ1−(1−q)
T
q
. (19)
Therefore, to minimize her expected cost, the detector with no additional information declares the
jump at time
τNo = arg min
τ=1:T+1
ENo{JD(τ, θ)}.1 (20)
The case τNo = T + 1 means that the belief µ the detector has in the good state of the Markov
chain is high enough that the best action for her is to keep silent over the whole horizon. Using
the optimal stopping time τNo, we can derive the principal’s utility as follows:
ENo{UP } = τNo − 1. (21)
The arguments above show that the detector who receives no new information remains silent
for τNo − 1 numbers of time slots. In the optimal time-based-prioritized mechanism (instance 2),
the principal’s commitment to provide almost accurate information in the future incentivizes the
detector to keep silent for n∗p − 1 periods of time without receiving any new information. The
difference η = n∗p − τNo, which we call the patience enhancement, measures by how much the
principal’s commitment increases the detector’s patience. In Fig. 3, we have plotted this measure
1For every fixed initial probability mass function, τNo is a deterministic quantity.
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(a) c = 0.1 (b) q = 0.1 (c) µ = 0.9
Figure 3: Color-coded map. Red: η= 0, Blue: η= 1, Green: η= 2, Black: η= 3, Cyan: 4≤ η≤ 6,
Yellow: 7≤η≤9, Magentic: η≥10.
η ≥ 1 η ≥ 4 η ≥ 7 η ≥ 10
c = 0.1 57.17% 13.38% 5.64% 2.94%
q = 0.1 69.57% 31.12% 8.13% 0%
µ = 0.9 56.65% 12.83% 5.14% 2.39%
Table 1: Probabilities of having a patience enhancement above certain thresholds
for different values of the parameters µ ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1] and c ∈ [0, 1]. In each sub-figure, we
fix one of the parameters and partition the space of the two remaining parameters in terms of
the patience enhancement η. Based on Fig. 3a, the detector’s patience increases by at least one
time slot in 57.17% of the cases, when c = 1. For c = 1, the patience enhancement is at least 4,
7 and 10 time slots in 13.38%, 5.64%, and 2.94% of the cases, respectively. The probabilities of
having a patience enhancement above thresholds 1, 4, 7, and 10, are depicted in Table 1 for each of
sub-figures 3a-3c. These results show that the principal’s commitment to provide almost accurate
information in the future can significantly enhance the detector’s patience.
Feature 3. In the optimal time-based prioritized mechanism derived by Algorithm 1, we choose
the maximum value of np such that there exists a qnp ∈ [0, 1] such that ρ = (np, qnp) satisfies all
the obedience constraints for times before np. To do so, at each round, the algorithm considers
a fix value of np and computes the maximum value of qnp that together with np satisfies all the
obedience constraints of times t ≤ np. We can simplify Algorithm 1 by using the result of next
theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose np ≥ τNo. Let
qtnp =
1
P(θ ≤ np)(
P(θ > t)
c
−
np−1∑
l=t
P(θ ≤ l)), (22)
denote the maximum value of qnp that together with np satisfies the obedience constraint of time
t. Then, we have
qτ
No
np = mint≤np
qtnp , (23)
where τNo is the time at which the detector declares the jump, when the principal employs a
no-information strategy.
Theorem 2 intuitively says that persuading the detector to keep silent at time τNo is the most
difficult challenge faced by the principal. This theorem suggests the following simplification for
Algorithm 1. To find the optimal mechanism, we can run Algorithm 1 up to np = τ
No − 1. Then,
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if the terminating condition (Lines 3-4) has not been satisfied yet, we can replace Line 2 of the
algorithm with
qnp =
1
P(θ ≤ np)(
P(θ > τNo)
c
−
np−1∑
l=τNo
P(θ ≤ l)), (24)
where τNo is derived by (20). This simplification reduces the complexity of Algorithm 1, as the
algorithm does not need to solve an optimization problem at each round, anymore. Instead, it can
solve the optimization problem (20) once and use the result to find the maximum feasible value of
qnp at each round.
Feature 4. In Fig. 3 and Table 1, we showed the superiority of our proposed mechanism
compared to the no-information mechanism. In this part, we want to compare our mechanism
with two other benchmark mechanisms, in terms of the expected utility they can provide for the
principal.
The first benchmark is the full information mechanism in which the principal reveals perfectly
the Markov chain’s state to the detector. The full information mechanism can be considered as a
time-based prioritized mechanism with np = 1, and qnp = 0. Therefore, we can conclude from (16)
and (1) that the expected utility the principal gets if he honestly shares his information with the
detector is
EFull{UP }=
T∑
t=1
P(θ>t)=
T∑
t=1
µ(1−q)t−1 = µ1−(1−q)
T
q
. (25)
The second benchmark we consider here, is the best static mechanism that can be employed by
the principal. This comparison highlights the power of dynamic mechanisms compared to static
ones. In a static mechanism, the set of messagesM that the principal sends to the detector at each
instant of time, as well as the distribution overM given the current state is time-independent. By
the direct revelation principle, without loss of generality, we can focus on direct static mechanisms
in which the detector follows the principal’s recommendations.
In a direct static mechanism, the principal recommends the detector to keep silent with prob-
ability ρst , where st ∈ {g, b} is the current state of the Markov chain. By an argument similar to
that in Lemma 3, we can show that in the optimal static mechanism, we have ρg = 1. Moreover,
we can show that the principal’s expected utility is an increasing function of ρb. Therefore, the
problem of finding the best static mechanism is equivalent to finding the maximum value of ρb such
that the mechanism satisfies the obedience constraints. By some algebra, the detector’s obedience
constraint at each time t can be derived as follows:
µ(1− q)t−1
µ(1− q)t−1 + (1− µ)ρtb +
∑t−1
τ=1 µ(1− q)τ−1qρt−τb
≥
c
T∑
l=t
(1− µ)ρlb +
∑l−1
τ=1 µ(1− q)τ−1qρl−τb
µ(1− q)t−1 + (1− µ)ρtb +
∑t−1
τ=1 µ(1− q)τ−1qρt−τb
(26)
where the left-hand side is the average cost of declaring a jump and the right-hand side is the
expected cost of keeping silent at time t, when the detector is recommended to keep silent. We
denote the maximum value of ρb ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies constraint (26) for each t ≤ T , by ρˆ. Therefore,
an efficient static mechanism for the principal is a direct mechanism with ρg = 1 and ρb = ρˆ. This
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Figure 4: Principal’s expected utility vs. delay cost, for µ = 0.9, q = 0.3, T = 50.
mechanism provides the principal with the following expected utility:
Estat{UP } =
T∑
t=1
[P(θ > t) +
t∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)ρˆt−θ
′+1] =
T∑
t=1
[µ (1− q)t−1 + (1− µ)ρˆt +
t∑
θ′=2
µ (1− q)θ′−2 q ρˆt−θ′+1]. (27)
In Fig. 4, we have illustrated the principal’s expected utility when he adopts the optimal
dynamic, best static, full-information and no-information mechanisms, for different delay costs c,
when µ = 0.9, q = 0.3 and T = 50. We observe that while the benchmark mechanisms outperform
each other in different regions, the optimal mechanism proposed in this paper always outperforms
all of them. In the comparison of different benchmarks, we can see that for low values of delay cost c,
the no-information mechanism outperforms the full-information and best static mechanisms. This
is simply because when the cost of delay is much lower than the false alarm fee, the detector with no
additional information prefers to postpone detecting the jump so as to avoid detecting a false alarm.
This behavior is in the principal’s favor and provides him with a high expected utility. However,
when the delay cost c goes up, the detector’s patience decreases and she prefers to detect the jump
sooner. In this situation, the performance of the best static mechanism is superior to that of the
two naive mechanisms described above (i.e., full-information and no-information mechanisms). It
can be observed from Fig. 4 that the percentage of principal’s utility enhancement in the optimal
mechanism proposed in this paper compared to the best available benchmark starts from 21.9%
when c = 0, goes up to 60.5% in c = 0.06 and then decreases gradually to 5.4% when the delay
cost reaches one.
6 Conclusion
We studied a dynamic Bayesian persuasion problem whereby a strategic principal observes the
evolution of a Markov chain and designs a recommendation policy that generates a recommendation
to a strategic detector at each time. The goals of the principal and the detector are different,
therefore, the long-term-optimizing detector does not have to obey the principal’s recommendations
unless she is convinced to do so. We presented a sequential recommendation policy that maximizes
the principal’s utility, and ensures the detector’s obedience. We proved that the optimal policy is a
threshold type, with two thresholds that can be explicitly computed. As time goes by, the optimal
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recommendation strategy first shifts from a no-information type to a randomized type and then
switches to a full-information type.
A Proof of Lemma 1
We want to show that at each time t, part of the recommendation policy ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t withNd(m1:t−1) >
1 does not appear on either the obedience constraints or the principal’s utility function. We first
look at the obedience constraints (7)-(8). Substituting (10), (11) and (12) in (7)-(8) shows that
inequalities
c+ Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = (k)t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T } ≤
(1 + c)
P(θ > t)
∏t
t′=1 ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)
∏t
t′=1 ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t′−1
t′
,∀t ∈ T , (28)
and
(1 + c)
P(θ > t)
∏t−1
t′=1 ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρt+1,(k)
t−1
t )∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)
∏t−1
t′=1 ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t′−1
t′ (1− ρmin (θ
′,t+1),(k)t−1
t′ )
≤
c+ Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d), at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T },∀t ∈ T , (29)
are equivalent to the obedience constraints (7)-(8). The expected value of the detector’s future
costs from time t+ 1 onward when she obeys the recommendations is
Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T } =
T∑
l=t+1
P(sl = g,mρt+1:l−1 = (k)
l−t−1,mρl = d|m1:t)+
T∑
l=t+1
c P(sl = b,mρt+1:l = (k)
l−t|m1:t), (30)
where the first term is the probability of occurring a false alarm and the second term is the expected
cost of delay in the detection of the jump. Using Bayes’ rule to calculate the probabilities appearing
in (30) for m1:t = (k)
t and m1:t = ((k)
t−1, d), we obtain
Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = (k)t, at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T } =
T∑
l=t+1
P(θ > l)
∏l−1
t′=1 ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρl+1,(k)
l−1
l )∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)
∏t
t′=1 ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t′−1
t′
+
T∑
l=t+1
c
∑l
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)
∏l
t′=1 ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t
′−1
t′∑T+1
θ′=1 P(θ = θ′)
∏t
t′=1 ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t′−1
t′
, (31)
and
Eρt+1:T {JD(τ, θ)|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d), at = k, at+1:T = mρt+1:T } =
A
B
, (32)
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where
A=
T∑
l=t+1
P(θ> l)
t−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1−ρt+1,(k)
t−1
t )
l−1∏
t′=t+1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ (1−ρ
l+1,(k)l−1−t
l )+
T∑
l=t+1
l∑
θ′=1
cP(θ= θ′)
t−1∏
t′=1
ρ
min(θ′,t′+1),(k)t
′−1
t′ (1−ρmin(θ
′,t+1),(k)t−1
t )
l∏
t′=t+1
ρ
min(θ′,t′+1),(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ ,
B =
T+1∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
t−1∏
t′=1
ρ
min (θ′,t′+1),(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρmin (θ
′,t+1),(k)t−1
t′ ),
(33)
and (k)t
′
−t is a vector of length t′ where all the components expect the t-th one equal k, and
the t-th component is d. Substituting (31) and (32) in (28)-(29), we can see that the terms of
the recommendation policy that appear in the obedience constraints have at most one d in their
message history. Furthermore, (9) shows that the principal’s utility function depends only on the
recommendation probabilities ρ
θt,m1:t−1
t where the message history is m1:t−1 = (k)t−1. Hence the
proof of Lemma 1 is complete.
B Proof of Lemma 2
For each time t, θ = 1, . . . , t means that the jump has occurred and the state of the Markov chain
becomes bad, i.e. st = b; furthermore, θ = t+ 1 captures the fact that the jump has not occurred
yet and the state is still good, i.e. st = g. Therefore, to prove Lemma 2, we need to show that it is
without loss of optimality if the principal restricts attention to recommendation policies with the
same ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t for all θ = 1, . . . , t. We claim that in this class of mechanisms, the recommendations
do not depend on the exact time of the jump, but only on whether it has occurred. To prove the
claim, we show that for each t ∈ T and each m1:t−1 with Nd(m1:t−1) ≤ 1, the parameters ρθ,m1:t−1t
with θ = 1, . . . , t always appear in the obedience constraints and the principal’s utility function as
parts of a constant linear combination. Therefore, as long as the value of this linear combination
is fixed, the values of the individual parameters can be customized. As a result, for each optimal
mechanism, we can construct another optimal mechanism in which for each t and each m1:t−1, the
values of all parameters ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t , with θ = 1, . . . , t, are the same.
We proceed by backward induction on time t.
Basis of induction. Let t = T . The recommendation policy of the final time T appears in the
obedience constraints of time T and of times t′ < T . We start our investigation by studying the
obedience constraints of time T . According to (7)-(11) and due to the fact that there is no future
after time T , the obedience constraints of time T are as follows:
c (1− P(sT = g|m1:T = (k)T )) ≤ P(sT = g|m1:T = (k)T ), (34)
and
P(sT = g|m1:T = ((k)t−1, d)) ≤ c (1− P(sT = g|m1:T = ((k)t−1, d))). (35)
By substituting (12) in (34) and (35) and canceling out the denominators, we can rewrite the
obedience constraints of time T as follows:
c
[
T∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
T∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′
]
≤ P(sT = g)
T∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ , (36)
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and
P(sT = g)
T−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρT+1,(k)
T−1
T ) ≤
c
[
T∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
T−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρθ
′,(k)T−1
T )
]
. (37)
It can be seen that in both constraints, the parameters ρ
θ,(k)T−1
T for θ = 1, . . . , T only appeared in
the following linear combination
T∑
θ′=1
ρ
θ′,(k)T−1
T P(θ = θ
′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
T−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ , (38)
which we denote by L(ρ
1,(k)T−1
T , . . . , ρ
T,(k)T−1
T ).
Now we investigate how the parameters ρ
θ,(k)T−1
T for θ = 1, . . . , T appear in the obedience
constraints of time t < T . According to (7)-(8), the obedience constraints of time t < T are as
follows:
c P(st = b|m1:t = (k)t)+
T∑
l=t+1
P(sl = g,mt+1:l−1 = (k)l−t−1,ml = d|m1:t = (k)t)+
T∑
l=t+1
c P(sl = b,mt+1:l = (k)l−t|m1:t = (k)t) ≤ P(st = g|m1:t = (k)t), (39)
and
P(st = g|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d)) ≤ cP(st = b|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d))+
T∑
l=t+1
P(sl = g,mt+1:l−1 = (k)l−t−1,ml = d|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d))+
T∑
l=t+1
cP(sl = b,mt+1:l = (k)l−t|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d)). (40)
We note that the distribution of st given the messages received up to time t does not depend on
the future policies ρt+1:T . For each l < T , the joint distribution of the state sl and the messages
received between t + 1 and l, does not either depend on the recommendation policy of time T .
Therefore, the only terms in (39) and (40) that depend on the recommendation policy of time T
are the terms appear in the summations with index l = T . The joint probability that the state
sT is good and a certain message sequence mt+1:T happens between t + 1 and T depends on the
recommendation policy the principal adopts at time T when the jump has not occurred, that is
θ = T + 1. Therefore, the only terms in the obedience constraints (39) and (40) that depend on
parameters ρ
θ,m1:T−1
T , θ = 1, . . . , T , are
P(sT = b,mt+1:T = (k)T−t|m1:t = (k)t) =
1
P(m1:t = (k)t)
(
T∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
T∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ ) (41)
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and
P(sT = b,mt+1:T = (k)T−t|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d)) = 1P(m1:t = ((k)t−1, d))
(
t−1∑
θ′=1
P(θ= θ′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρθ
′,(k)t−1
t )
T∏
t′=t+1
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ +
P(θ = t)
t−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1− ρt,(k)
t−1
t )
T∏
t′=t+1
ρ
t,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ +
T∑
θ′=t+1
P(θ= θ′)
t−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ (1−ρt+1,(k)
t−1
t )
θ′−1∏
t′=t+1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′
T∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ ), (42)
respectively. Equation (41) is a multiple of L(ρ
1,(k)T−1
T , . . . , ρ
T,(k)T−1
T ). Therefore, we can change the
individual values of ρ
θ,(k)T−1
T , θ = 1, . . . , T , without violating the obedience constraint (39), as long
as the value of the function L remains constant. Equation (42) includes parts of recommendation
policy of time T which correspond to message history (k)T−1−t . These parameters do not appear
in any other constraint or in principal’s utility function. Therefore, as long as the probability
P(sT = b,mt+1:T = (k)T−t|m1:t = ((k)t−1, d)), given by (42), remains constant, changing the values
of parameters ρ
θ,(k)T−1−t
T , θ = 1, . . . , T does not violate the obedience property of the mechanism.
The last point we should check is the effect of parameters ρ
θ,m1:T−1
T , θ = 1, . . . , T , on the
principal’s utility. According to (9), the principal’s utility is
E1:T {UP (τ)|ρ} =
T+1∑
θ′=1
P(θ= θ′)
[
θ′−1∑
t=1
t∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ +
T∑
t=θ′
(
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ )
]
=
T+1∑
θ′=1
P(θ= θ′)
[
θ′−1∑
t=1
t∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′ +
T−1∑
t=θ′
(
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ )
]
+
T∑
θ′=1
ρ
θ′,(k)T−1
T P(θ = θ
′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
T−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ (43)
It can be seen that the parameters ρ
θ,(k)T−1
T for θ = 1, . . . , T do not appear in the first additive
term of (43). These parameters only appeared in the second component of (43) as parts of the
linear function L(ρ
1,(k)T−1
T , . . . , ρ
T,(k)T−1
T ). Therefore, for each optimal mechanism we can construct
another optimal mechanism where for each message sequence m1:T−1, the values of parameters
ρ
θ,m1:t−1
T , θ = 1, . . . , T , are the same. For each m1:T−1, we denote this common value by ρ
b,m1:T−1
T ,
θ = 1, . . . , T .
Induction step. Suppose that the statement of the lemma is true for times after t. Now, we
want to prove that it is also true for time t. To prove this fact, we employ an approach similar to
the one used in proving the basis of induction. We show that for each m1:t−1, parameters ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t
with θ = 1, . . . , t appear in all the obedience constraints and the principal’s utility function as parts
of a constant linear combination. To do so, we first study the obedience constraints of time t. The
obedience constraints of time t are as in (39)-(40). By some basic algebra, one can show that the
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parameters ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t with θ = 1, . . . , t, appear in (39) as the following linear combination
t∑
θ′=1
ρ
θ′,(k)t−1
t P(θ = θ
′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ (
T∑
l=t
l∏
t′=t+1
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ ). (44)
By the induction hypothesis, the probabilities of recommending silence at times greater than t do
not depend on the exact time of the jump. Therefore, for each t′ ≥ t+ 1 we can replace ρθ′,(k)t
′−1
t′
by ρ
b,(k)t
′−1
t′ . This replacement makes the last multiplicative term of (44) independent of θ
′; hence
we can neglect it. Therefore, the simplified form of the linear combination in which parameters
ρ
θ,(k)t−1
t with θ = 1, . . . , t appear is
t∑
θ′=1
ρ
θ′,(k)t−1
t P(θ = θ
′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ . (45)
We denote this linear combination by L(ρ
1,(k)t−1
t , . . . , ρ
t,(k)t−1
t ). Now we investigate the second
obedience constraint (40) of time t. We can show that the parameters ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t with θ = 1, . . . , t,
appear in (40) as the following linear combination
t∑
θ′=1
ρ
θ′,(k)t−1
t P(θ = θ
′)
θ′−1∏
t′=1
ρ
t′+1,(k)t
′−1
t′
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
t′ (
T∑
l=t
l∏
t′=t+1
ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ ). (46)
By the induction hypothesis, we have ρ
θ′,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ = ρ
b,(k)t
′−1
−t
t′ , for t
′ ≥ t + 1. Using this equality, the
last multiplicative term of (46) becomes independent of θ′; hence can be neglected. This makes the
linear combination of (46) exactly the same as L(ρ
1,(k)t−1
t , . . . , ρ
t,(k)t−1
t ). Therefore, the parameters
ρ
θ,(k)t−1
t with θ = 1, . . . , t appear in the obedience constraints of time t as parts of one single linear
combination.
There are two other sets of obedience constraints that we should study: obedience constraints
at times before t and obedience constraints at times after t. Following the same steps as above,
we can show that the parameters ρ
θ,(k)t−1
t , with θ = 1, . . . , t, appear in all obedience constraints
as well as the principal’s utility function as parts of the linear function L(ρ
1,(k)t−1
t , . . . , ρ
t,(k)t−1
t ).
Therefore, as long as the value of this linear combination remains constant, changing the values
of the individual parameters ρ
θ,(k)t−1
t , θ = 1, . . . , T does not violate the obedience constraints or
change the principal’s benefit. Other parameters of the recommendation policy of time t that
appear in the obedience constraints are ρ
θ,(k)t−1
−t′
t , where θ = 1, . . . , t and t
′ = 1, . . . , t − 1. For
each t′ = 1, . . . , t − 1, the parameters ρθ,(k)
t−1
−t′
t , with θ = 1, . . . , t, appear as a linear combination
only in the obedience constraint of time t′ when mt′ = d. Therefore, as long as the value of this
linear combination remains constant, changing the values of parameters ρ
θ,(k)t−1−t′
T , θ = 1, . . . , t does
not make any difference. Combining all the arguments above we conclude that, for each optimal
mechanism we can construct another optimal mechanism such that for each message sequence
m1:t−1, the values of parameters ρ
θ,m1:t−1
t , θ = 1, . . . , t, are the same. For each m1:t−1, we denote
this common value by ρ
b,m1:t−1
t , θ = 1, . . . , t.
Conclusion. By the principle of induction, the statement is true for all t = 1, . . . , T . This
completes the proof of lemma 2.
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C Proof of Lemma 3
We prove this Lemma by showing that we can increase the utility of principal in an obedient
mechanism by setting ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1, for any t ∈ T , and this change does not violate any of the
obedience constraints. Having ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1 guarantees that the recommendations to declare the jump
always will be obeyed by the detector. Therefore, in the following we focus on the recommendations
to keep silent and show that by this change, the detector will be more willing to obey this kind of
recommendations.
We proved in Lemma 2 that, without loss of optimality, at any time t ∈ T the principal can
restrict attention to recommendation policies that depend only on the message profile m1:t−1 and
the current state st of the Markov chain (not on the state evolution). For any fixed recommendation
policy ρ of the form suggested by Lemma 2, the detector is faced with a quickest detection problem
[55]. However, there is a subtle difference between the standard quickest detection problem [55] and
the one arising in our setup. In the standard quickest detection problem the detector’s decision at
any time t depends only on her posterior belief pˆit = P(st = g|m1:t) about the state of the Markov
chain at t. In the quickest detection problem arising in our setup, the detector’s decision at any
time t depends on the received messages m1:t, the principal’s recommendation policy ρ, and her
belief
pit = P(st = g|m1:t,ρ). (47)
This difference is due to the fact that at any time t the principal’s fixed recommendation policy
ρt+1 depends on m1:t, therefore, the detector needs keep m1:t in order to determine the statistics
of mt+1 so as to update her information at time t + 1. Consequently, in our setup, the detector’s
information state at any time t is (pit,m1:t,ρ). The detector’s optimal strategy γ
∗ = (γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗T )
is determined by the dynamic program
WT (piT ,m1:T ,ρ) = min [piT , c (1− piT )], (48)
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) =
min [pit, c (1−pit) + E{Wt+1(pit+1,m1:t,mt+1,ρ)|pit,m1:t,ρ}], t= 1, . . . , T−1, (49)
where
pit+1 = Tt(pit,m1:t,mt+1,ρ), (50)
Tt(.) is determined by Bayes’ rule, and mt+1 is a random variable that takes values in the set {d, k};
the statistics of mt+1 are determined by m1:t, the state st+1 of the Markov chain at time t + 1,
and the recommendation policy ρ. The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of (48) and (49)
represents the detector’s expected cost due to her decision to stop at t and declare that jump has
occurred (at = 1); the second term on the RHS of (48) and (49) represents the detector’s expected
cost due to her decision to wait/remain silent at time t (at = 0). The second term on the RHS of
(49) is equal to
c (1− pit) + P(mt+1 = k|pit,m1:t,ρ)Wt+1(Tt(pit,m1:t, k,ρ),m1:t, k,ρ)+
P(mt+1 = d|pit,m1:t,ρ)Wt+1(Tt(pit,m1:t, d,ρ),m1:t, d,ρ). (51)
Furthermore,
P(mt+1 = k|pit,m1:t,ρ) = pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1 + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1 . (52)
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Using (49) and (52) and Bayes’ rule to write explicitly Tt(pit,m1:t, k,ρ) and Tt(pit,m1:t, d,ρ), we
obtain
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) = min
[
pit, c (1−pit) + (pit(1−q)ρg,m1:tt+1 + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )
Wt+1(
pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1
pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1 + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1
,m1:t, k,ρ)+
(pit(1−q)(1−ρg,m1:tt+1 )+(1−pit(1−q))(1−ρb,m1:tt+1 ))
Wt+1(
pit(1− q)(1−ρg,m1:tt+1 )
pit(1−q)(1−ρg,m1:tt+1 )+(1−pit(1−q))(1−ρb,m1:tt+1 )
,m1:t, d,ρ)
]
.
(53)
We use (48) and (53) to prove Lemma 3. To do this we first establish the following auxiliary results
(Lemmas 5-8). The proof of these lemmas is presented at the end of Appendix 32.
Lemma 5. For any fixed time t and any fixed message profile m1:t, Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) is a concave
function of pit.
Lemma 6. For any fixed time t, any fixed message profile m1:t, and any belief pit, Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ)
is a concave function of ρg,m1:tt+1 .
Lemma 7. In an obedient mechanism, we must have ρg,m1:tt+1 ∈ [ρb,m1:tt+1 , 1], for any time t and any
message profile m1:t.
Lemma 8. For any fixed time t, any fixed message profile m1:t, and any belief pit, we have
arg min
ρ
g,m1:t
t+1
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) = 1. (54)
Lemma 8 shows that setting ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1 decreases the value function Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ). Using this
result, we complete the proof of Lemma 3, that is, we show that when the Markov chain is in the
good state, irrespective of the message history, it is always optimal for the principal to recommend
the detector to keep silent. That is
ρ∗ g,m1:tt+1 = 1, ∀t,m1:t. (55)
We prove this by contradiction. Consider an optimal recommendation policy ρ∗ and assume
that there exists at least one time t and one message profile m1:t such that ρ
∗ g,m1:t
t+1 < 1. We
construct another recommendation policy ρ such that ρb,m1:tt+1 = ρ
∗ b,m1:t
t+1 , ρ
g,m1:t
t+1 = 1, and for all
other times the policies ρ and ρ∗ are the same. We show that the policy ρ leads to a higher
expected utility for the principal and satisfies the obedience constraints corresponding to situations
where the detector is recommended to keep silent. Repeating the above argument for all times s
such that ρ∗ g,m1:ss+1 < 1 we construct a policy ρˆ that satisfies ρˆ
∗ g,m1:t
t+1 = 1, ∀t ∈ T , it improves the
principal’s expected utility as compared to ρ∗ and incentivizes the detector to keep silent when
she is recommended to do so. In the new mechanism ρˆ, when the detector is recommended to
declare the jump, she is sure that the Markov chain is in the bad state; hence, she will obey the
recommendations for sure. Therefore, the mechanism ρˆ is a policy with higher expected utility
than ρ∗ that satisfies all the obedience constraints. This contradicts the optimality of ρ∗.
To prove the claim stated above, we investigate the effect of setting ρg,m1:tt+1 to one on the
detector’s incentives to keep silent at times t′ ≤ t and t′ > t.
2Lemma 5 is needed so as to prove Lemma 7. Lemmas 6 and 7 are needed so as to prove Lemma 8. Lemma 8 is
essential in establishing Lemma 3.
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Times t′ where t′ ≤ t: In this case, we show that setting ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1 reduces the value function
at time t′. Therefore, if in the original mechanism we had Wt′(pit′ ,m1:t′ ,ρ∗) < pit′ (meaning that
the detector had incentives to keep silent), in the new mechanism with ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1 this situation
still holds. Therefore, the recommendation to keep silent at time t′ will be obeyed. We prove this
claim by backward induction on time t′ as follows.
Basis of induction. t′ = t. The result follows from Lemma 8.
Induction step. Suppose that setting ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1 decreases the value function Wk+1(.), k+1 <
t. We prove that this is also true for time k. Consider the RHS of (53) for time k as follows:
Wk(pik,m1:k,ρ)=min
[
pik, c (1−pik) + (pik(1−q)ρg,m1:kk+1 +(1−pik(1−q))ρb,m1:kk+1 )
Wk+1(
pik(1− q)ρg,m1:kk+1
pik(1− q)ρg,m1:kk+1 + (1− pik(1− q))ρb,m1:kk+1
,m1:k, k,ρ)+
(pik(1−q)(1−ρg,m1:kk+1 )+(1−pik(1−q))(1−ρb,m1:kk+1 ))
Wk+1(
pik(1− q)(1− ρg,m1:kk+1 )
pik(1−q)(1−ρg,m1:kk+1 )+(1−pik(1−q))(1−ρb,m1:kk+1 )
,m1:k,d,ρ)
]
.
(56)
The first term of the minimum does not depend on ρg,m1:tt+1 . The only component of the second term
of the minimum that depends on ρg,m1:tt+1 is the value function Wk+1(.). By the induction hypothesis,
setting ρg,m1:tt+1 to one decreases Wk+1(.) for any input, therefore, it decreases Wk(.) (by Eq. (53)).
Conclusion. By the principle of induction, the statement is true for all t′ ≤ t.
Times t′ where t′ > t: Changing the value of ρg,m1:tt+1 with m1:t 6= (k)t has no effect on the
obedience constraints (7)-(8) at time t′ > t. However, setting ρg,(k)
t
t+1 = 1 increases the detector’s
belief in the good state of the Markov chain at time t′ when she is recommended to keep silent.
This is because we have
pit′ = P(st′ = g|m1:t′ ,ρ) =
P(st′ = g)
∏t′
t′′=1 ρ
g,(k)t
′′−1
t′′
P(st′ = g)
∏t′
t′′=1 ρ
g,(k)t′′−1
t
′′ +P(st′ = b,m1:t′ = (k)t′)
. (57)
It is easy to show that the dependence of the RHS of (57) on the parameter ρ
g,(k)t
t+1 is of the form
aρ
g,(k)t
t+1
bρ
g,(k)t
t+1 + d
, (58)
where a, b, d are positive real numbers. This function is increasing in terms of ρ
g,(k)t
t+1 . Therefore,
setting ρ
g,(k)t
t+1 = 1 increases the belief of the detector in the good state of the Markov chain when
she is recommended to keep silent.
We proved that for any (fixed) recommendation policy ρ, at each time t, there is a threshold
l
(k)t,ρ
t such that the detector keeps silent when she is recommended to do so if and only if P(st =
g|m1:t = (k)t,ρ) > l(k)
t,ρ
t . In the optimal mechanism ρ
∗, the detector obeys the recommendation to
keep silent at t′, i.e. P(st′ = g|(k)t′ ,ρ∗) > l(k)
t′ ,ρ∗
t′ . In the modified mechanism ρ, where ρ
g,(k)t
t+1 = 1,
we have l
(k)t
′
,ρ
t′ = l
(k)t
′
,ρ∗
t′ for all t
′ > t because for t′ > t the value function Wt′(pit′ ,m1:t′ ,ρ)
depends only on ρt′+1:T and ρt′+1:T = ρ
∗
t′+1:T . Since, by the arguments above, P(st′ = g|(k)t
′
,ρ) >
P(st′ = g|(k)t′ ,ρ∗) > l(k)
t′ ,ρ∗
t′ = l
(k)t
′
,ρ
t′ , under ρ the detector obeys the recommendation to remain
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silent at time t′. From the arguments above it follows that under ρ the detector always obeys the
recommendation to keep silent.
Based on Eq. (9), we conclude that the principal’s utility is an increasing function of the
recommendation probabilities ρg,m1:tt+1 . Therefore, the new constructed mechanism ρ results in a
higher utility for the principal and the detector always obeys the recommendation to keep silent.
Repeating the above argument for all times s such that ρ∗ g,m1:ss+1 < 1 we construct a policy ρˆ that
satisfies ρˆ∗ g,m1:tt+1 = 1,∀t ∈ T , it improves the principal’s expected utility as compared to ρ∗ and
incentivizes the detector to keep silent when she is recommended to do so. In the new mechanism
ρˆ, when the detector is recommended to declare the jump, she is sure that the Markov chain is
in the bad state; hence, she will obey the recommendations for sure. Therefore, the mechanism ρˆ
is a policy with higher expected utility than ρ∗ that satisfies all the obedience constraints. This
contradicts the optimality of ρ∗ and proves Lemma 3.
D Proof of Lemma 5
We prove this by backward induction on time t.
Basis of induction. Let t = T . According to (53), for each message profile m1:T ,
WT (piT ,m1:T ,ρ) is the minimum of two affine, hence concave, functions of piT . Minimum con-
serves concavity. Therefore, WT (piT ,m1:T ,ρ) is a concave function of piT .
Induction step. Suppose that Wt+1(pit+1,m1:t+1,ρ) is a concave function of pit+1. Now, we
want to show this is also true for t. Concave functions can be written as the infimum of affine
functions; so we have
Wt+1(pit+1,m1:t+1,ρ) = inf
i
[
α
m1:t+1
i pit+1 + β
m1:t+1
i
]
. (59)
Substituting (59) in (53), we have
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) = min
[
pit, c (1− pit) + inf
i
{
αm1:t,ki pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1 +
βm1:t,ki (pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1 + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )
}
+ inf
i
{
αm1:t,di pit(1− q)
(1−ρg,m1:tt+1 )+βm1:t,di (pit(1−q)(1− ρg,m1:tt+1 ) + (1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 ))
}]
.
(60)
It can be seen that the terms inside of both infima are affine in pit, hence concave. Therefore, since
the infimum preserve concavity, each term inside the minimum is concave in pit. Using the concavity
preserving of the minimum function proves the concavity of the value function Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) in
terms of pit.
Conclusion. By the principle of induction, the statement is true for all t = 1, . . . , T . This
completes the proof of lemma 5.
E Proof of Lemma 6
The assertion of this lemma easily follows from (60).
F Proof of Lemma 7
In Lemma 5 we proved that: at any time t, the expected cost of the detector due to her decision
to stop and declare the jump (at = 1) is given by the first term of the RHS of (60) and is a linear
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increasing function of pit; the expected cost due to her decision to remain silent is given by the
second term of the RHS of (60) and is a concave function of pit. Denote the above expected costs
by Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 1) and Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 0), respectively.
Now, we claim that if
Vt(pi,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) < Vt(pi,m1:t,ρ, at = 1) (61)
for some pi, then (61) is also true for all pi′ > pi.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that
Vt(pi,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) < Vt(pi,m1:t,ρ, at = 1), (*)
and there exists a belief pi′ > pi where
Vt(pi
′,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) > Vt(pi′,m1:t,ρ, at = 1). (**)
We know that
Vt(0,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) = c > 0 = Vt(0,m1:t,ρ, at = 1). (***)
Therefore, (*)-(***) show that the graphs of functions Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) and Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at =
1) have two intersections l1 ∈ (0, pi) and l2 ∈ (pi, pi′), where the graph of Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) is
below the line Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 1) in the interval (l
1, l2). This contradicts the concavity of the
function Vt(pit,m1:t,ρ, at = 0) and hence the claim is true. The truth of this claim shows that at
any time t and for any fixed m1:t and ρ, the detector’s optimal policy is of threshold type with
respect to pit; that is there is a threshold l
m1:t,ρ
t such that the detector declares the jump if and only
if her belief pit about the good state of the Markov chain is below the threshold l
m1:t,ρ
t . Therefore,
for a mechanism to be obedient we need to have the following property:
P(st+1 = g|m1:t,ρ,mt+1 = d) ≤ P(st+1 = g|m1:t,ρ,mt+1 = k), ∀t,m1:t. (62)
Writing the probabilities appearing in (62) in terms of the belief of time t, we can simplify the
necessary condition (62) as follows:
pit(1− q)(1− ρg,m1:tt+1 )
pit(1− q)(1− ρg,m1:tt+1 ) + (1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )
≤
pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1
pit(1− q)ρg,m1:tt+1 + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1
, ∀t,m1:t. (63)
Simplifying the above expression gives us ρg,m1:tt+1 ≥ ρb,m1:tt+1 as a necessary condition for an obedient
mechanism, and hence completes the proof of Lemma 7.
G Proof of Lemma 8
According to Lemma 6, Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) is a concave function of ρ
g,m1:t
t+1 . Therefore, the minimum of
the function is attained either at the beginning or at the end of the feasible interval of the parameter
ρg,m1:tt+1 which is derived in Lemma 7 as [ρ
b,m1:t
t+1 , 1]. Therefore, to prove Lemma 8, we only need to
show that
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 =1)≤Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 =ρb,m1:tt+1 ), (64)
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for every time t, belief pit, and message profile m1:t, where ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 } denotes the recommendation
policy ρ excluding the element ρg,m1:tt+1 . Using (53), we have
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) =
min
[
pit, c (1− pit) + (pit(1−q) + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )
Wt+1(
pit(1− q)
pit(1−q) + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1
,m1:t, k,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1)+
(1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(0,m1:t, d,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1)
]
.
(65)
When the detector is sure that the state is bad, she will declare the jump irrespective of the message
she has received, and incurs no cost. Therefore, we have
Wt+1(0,m1:t, d,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) =
Wt+1(0,m1:t, k,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) = 0. (66)
This equality allows us to replace Wt+1(0,m1:t, d,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) in (65) by
Wt+1(0,m1:t, k,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) and get
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) =
min
[
pit, c (1− pit) + (pit(1−q) + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )
Wt+1(
pit(1− q)
pit(1−q) + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1
,m1:t, k,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1)+
(1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(0,m1:t, k,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1)
]
.
(67)
It can be concluded from (48) and (53) that for any t and any fixed pit and m1:t, the value function
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) is independent of the recommendation policies ρt′ , t
′ ≤ t (the effect of ρt′ , t′ ≤ t, on
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ) is captured/summarized by pit and m1:t.). Therefore, we can write (67) as
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = 1) =
min
[
pit, c (1− pit) + (pit(1− q) + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )
Wt+1(
pit(1− q)
pit(1− q) + (1− pit(1− q))ρb,m1:tt+1
,m1:t, k,ρ)+
(1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(0,m1:t, k,ρ)
]
.
(68)
When ρg,m1:tt+1 = ρ
b,m1:t
t+1 , we have from (53) that
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = ρb,m1:tt+1 ) = min [pit, c (1− pit)+
ρb,m1:tt+1 Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, k,ρ) + (1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, d,ρ)
]
.
(69)
In this case, the message sent by the principal at time t is independent of the observed state.
Therefore, the detector neglects this data in her future decisions. Thus, we have
Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, k,ρ) = Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, d,ρ). (70)
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Substituting (70) into (69) gives
Wt(pit,m1:t,ρ\{ρg,m1:tt+1 }, ρg,m1:tt+1 = ρb,m1:tt+1 ) =
min [pit, c (1− pit) +Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, k,ρ)]. (71)
According to Lemma 5, Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, k,ρ) is a concave function of its first element. Thus,
we have
(pit(1−q)+(1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(
pit(1− q)
pit(1−q) + (1−pit(1−q))ρb,m1:tt+1
,m1:t, k,ρ)
+ (1− pit(1− q))(1− ρb,m1:tt+1 )Wt+1(0,m1:t, k,ρ) ≤Wt+1(pit(1− q),m1:t, k,ρ). (72)
Comparing (68) and (71) based on the result derived in (72) proves that the inequality (64) holds;
hence the statement of Lemma 8 is true.
H Proof of Lemma 4
We show that for each optimal sequential information disclosure mechanism ρ there is a time-based
prioritized mechanism which obtains the same expected utility for the principal and satisfies all the
obedience constraints.
Based on Lemma 3, we set ρ
g,(k)t−1
t = 1, for all t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Furthermore, we let ρ
st,m1:t−1
t
be arbitrary 0 ≤ ρst,m1:t−1t ≤ 1, whenever m1:t−1 6= (k)t−1. Thus, we concentrate on ρb,(k)
t−1
t ,
t = 1, 2, . . . , T . For ease of notation, throughout the remainder of the proof we denote ρ
b,(k)t−1
t by
ρt.
Consider an optimal mechanism ρ and let time t be the last time period where ρt < 1 and
ρt+1 > 0. Using the result of Lemma 3 and the new notation, we find that the principal’s expected
utility according to ρ is
Eρ{UP } =
T∑
l=1
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ +
T∑
l=1
T+1∑
θ′=l+1
P(θ = θ′). (73)
It is clear from (73) that the principal’s utility is a continuous and increasing function of each ρt′ ,
t′ = 1, 2, . . . , T . Since ρt+1 > 0 there exists a γ > 0 such that ρˆt+1 = ρt+1 − γ ≥ 0. Replacing ρt+1
by ρˆt+1 reduces the expected utility of the principal. However, since E{UP (τ)} is a continuously
increasing function of ρt, there exists some (γ) > 0 such that increasing ρt by the amount of (γ)
can compensate this decrease. This compensation is feasible if ρˆt = ρt + (γ) does not exceed its
upper limit 1. To ensure this, we take γ = min (−1(1− ρt), ρt+1), where −1(.) is the inverse of
function (.). The function (.) is one to one and increasing in γ, hence it has an inverse 2. Choosing
this γ results in either ρˆt = 1 or ρˆt+1 = 0.
The arguments above show that the principal’s expected utility when he discloses his information
based on the mechanism ρˆ, where ρˆt′ = ρt′ , for all t
′ 6= t, t+ 1, and
ρˆt = ρt + (γ), ρˆt+1 = ρt+1 − γ, (74)
is the same as the average utility he gets when he uses the optimal mechanism ρ; i.e.
T∑
l=1
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρˆt′ =
T∑
l=1
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ . (75)
2The explicit declaration of function (.) can be derived from equation (78) that will be derived later.
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Therefore, showing the new mechanism ρˆ satisfies the obedience constraints will prove its optimality.
Since the recommendation to declare that the jump has occurred is always obeyed, we only
need to investigate the obedience constraints (7) when the detector is recommended to keep silent.
Using the results derived in (28) and (31), we can show that the mechanism ρˆ satisfies the obedience
constraints if and only if
c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρˆt′ ≤ 1−
t′′∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′), ∀t′′ ∈ T . (76)
Using (75) we can show that for t′′ ≤ t, we have
c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρˆt′ = c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ ≤ 1−
t′′∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′), (77)
where the last inequality follows from the obedience property of the original mechanism ρ. There-
fore, the obedience constraint for all times before t is satisfied. To show this is also true for times
after t we need to take a closer look at (75). Canceling out the equal terms from both sides of the
equality derived in (75), we get
(γ)
t∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ +
(
− γP(θ = t+ 1)+
((γ)ρt+1 − γρt − γ(γ))
t∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρt′
) T∑
l=t+1
l∏
t′=t+2
ρt′ = 0. (78)
The first term in (78) and
∑T
l=t+1
∏l
t′=t+2 ρt′ are both non-negative. Therefore, we have
−γP(θ = t+ 1) + ((γ)ρt+1 − γρt − γ(γ))
t∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ ≤ 0. (79)
By substituting (74) in the left hand side of the obedience constraint (76) for time t′′ ≥ t + 1, we
obtain
c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρˆt′ = c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρt′+
(
−γP(θ= t+1)+((γ)ρt+1−γρt−γ(γ))
t∑
θ′=1
P(θ= θ′)
t−1∏
t′=θ′
ρt′
) T∑
l=t′′
l∏
t′=t+2
ρt′ ≤
c
T∑
l=t′′
l∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′)
l∏
t′=θ′
ρt′ ≤ 1−
t′′∑
θ′=1
P(θ = θ′), (80)
where the first inequality is based on (79), and the second one follows from the fact that the original
mechanism ρ is obedient, hence it satisfies the obedience constraints (76). The results derived in
(77) and (80) show that the new mechanism ρˆ satisfies the obedience constraints, hence it is optimal.
In this new mechanism, we have either ρˆt = 1 or ρˆt+1 = 0. Therefore, irrespective of the original
mechanism ρ, the new (modified) mechanism satisfies the condition of having a time-based priority
for recommending the detector to keep silent at time t and at the next time period t+ 1.
It is clear from the above arguments that by repeating this procedure for any time t that violates
the priority condition in a backward direction we can construct a time-based prioritized mechanism
which is optimal. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
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I Proof of Theorem 2
After removing the terms in (22) that do not depend on t and doing some simple algebra, we have
arg min
t≤np
qtnp = arg min
t≤np
P(θ > t)− c np−1∑
l=t
P(θ ≤ l)
 =
arg min
t≤np
P(θ > t) + c np−1∑
l=1
P(θ ≤ l)− c
np−1∑
l=t
P(θ ≤ l)
 =
arg min
t≤np
[
P(θ > t) + c
t−1∑
l=1
P(θ ≤ l)
]
arg min
t≤np
ENo{JD(t, θ)}.
(81)
In Feature 2, we showed that JD(t, θ) attains its minimum at t = τNo. Therefore, since np ≥ τNo,
we have
arg min
t≤np
qtnp = τ
No. (82)
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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